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Measurements are shown to be processes designed to return figures: they are effective. This
effectivity allows for a formalization as Turing machines, which can be described employing compu-
tation theory. Inspired in the halting problem we draw some limitations for measurement procedures:
procedures that verify if a quantity is measured cannot work in every case.
INTRODUCTION
Measurements play a central role in modern
science. ”In science ... facts are determined by
observation or measurement of natural or ex-
perimental phenomena. A hypothesis is a pro-
posed explanation of those facts. A theory is
a hypothesis that has gained wide acceptance
because it has survived rigorous investigation
of its predictions. . . .”[18].
In physics in particular, there is an extraor-
dinary accordance between the results from cal-
culations and results from measurements. This
accordance between experiments and theory is
very commonly used to validate the theory from
where the prediction came, and sometimes is
also used to argue in favor of a particular inter-
pretation for such theory. In the complex inter-
play between experiments and theory develop-
ment, measurements have a central importance
[13].
Therefore, in the main trend of science, in
one hand measurements have a tremendous
weight in assessing the "trueness" of theories,
but at the same time they are hardly analyzed,
not a particular measurement but the concept
and practice itself, just being taken for granted
as a trusted way to obtain data. This situation
has been clearly stated in [16], where it has
received the name of "paradox of foundation"
and is defined in these lines:
As all empirical sciences were ask-
ing measurement to play the foun-
dational role of "protocol of truth"
and Measurement Science accepted
this function of delegate to deal
with "pure data", measurement it-
self was forced to the paradoxical
position of being at the same time
the most empirically objective op-
eration, because of its institutional
tasks, and the most metaphysically
based one, because of its conceptual
foundation on the hypothesis of the
existence of true values. We will call
this clashing situation the "Paradox
of Foundation" (PoF) for measure-
ment.
The main step in order to analyze measure-
ments under a critical eye was taken at the
end of nineteen century by Helmholtz [21]. He
was followed by Campbell, Holder, Ellis and
others [3, 5–7]. These works are now con-
sidered part of the representational view of
measurement[12, 14, 20]. In this view, at the
heart of every measurement is a correspon-
dence (homomorphism) between empirical ac-
tions and mathematical operations.
At the beginning of this century there have
been proposals to go beyond the representa-
tional description [8, 15]. This work contributes
in this direction analyzing an important ele-
ment of measurements: the measurement pro-
cedures. According to the International vocab-
ulary of metrology [9], a measurement proce-
dure is a "detailed description of a measure-
ment...". We propose a formal characterization
of this key element in measurements using al-
gorithms and its theoretical framework. This
proposal emerges from the parallelism between
the intersubjetive properties of both entities.
Using an analogous argument to the halting
problem in Turing machines, we draw limita-
tions in the possible measurement and verifica-
tion procedures.
MEASUREMENTS AS PROCESSES
When we take a look to modern research lab-
oratories around the globe, there is a very inter-
esting feature that attracts the attention of peo-
ple not related to the work in the lab: as years
pass there is less human labor and more auto-
mated labor in the execution of experiments.
Sometimes a whole experiment is started by
pressing a button, then there is no other hu-
man intervention. This is a good feature to
experimenters since leaves them more time to
improve their experiments or design new ones.
In those completely automated experiments,
computers play a fundamental role, inside them
all the instructions needed to perform the ex-
periment have been written previously. Such
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2computers communicate with devices that al-
lows them to "impose" conditions in the exper-
iment, and also to verify them or "measure" a
quantity, for instance some voltages or currents.
Therefore, computers run the "logical part" or
"instructions", giving orders to the different in-
terfaces in order to perform such actions.
Since we live in times where technology is
more and more part of our daily life, this situa-
tion can be seen as a mere consequence of such
era and its huge technological capabilities. We
invite the reader to follow another interpreta-
tion of this situation.
According to the International Vocabulary of
Measurement (VIM) [9] a measurement is:
[A] process of experimentally ob-
taining one or more quantity values
that can reasonably be attributed
to a quantity.
There are three important elements in this def-
inition: measurement is a process, the end of
which is to obtain a quantity value that is at-
tributed to a quantity. Though these three el-
ements are of importance for our analysis, we
will focus on the first one: measurement is a
process.
Process is a term used to name some ac-
tions in a specific order. For instance in dictio-
nary process is defined as: "A series of actions
or steps taken in order to achieve a particular
end." [19]. Examples of this can be found in
daily life, a cooking recipe is a very common
example of a process, is composed of actions
like "set the oven to 150 degrees", "mix three
eggs with sugar", and others. Putting together
a prefabricated desk is also a process. These
normally include a set of instructions that de-
scribe the process needed to assemble it.
Measurements, in the current conception of
the scientific community, do fit as processes.
They consist in a series of actions with a very
specific end: to obtain the result of the mea-
surement, the quantity value. They are com-
posed of steps or actions. For instance, in or-
der to measure the length of the table is neces-
sary to use a ruler, put it parallel to the length
of such table, one end of the ruler must touch
one end of the table, then read the number, or
closest number to the other end of the table.
These steps can be considered the bricks that
constitutes the measurement. It must be kept
in mind, however, that following them only pro-
vides the quantity value.
These characteristics of measurement help us
to understand the extensive use of computers in
the modern lab. Since measurements are pro-
cesses with a definite order, i.e. with some log-
ical structure, it is possible to write that order
in a computer which will execute the actions
in the right sequence, when all the elements
needed are provided.
In principle, all the actions required to per-
form a measurement can be described to other
persons, talking to them, writing to them, etc.
This description is called the measurement pro-
cedure. According to the VIM[9] a measure-
ment procedure is:
[A] detailed description of a mea-
surement according to one or more
measurement principles and to a
given measurement method, based
on a measurement model and in-
cluding any calculation to obtain a
measurement result.
In the scheme we’ve been developing, each ac-
tion is related or described by an instruction
in the procedure, usually written as an impera-
tive sentence. Within this description the order
in which the actions should be followed is also
given. The main idea is that every person with
access to the measurement procedures and ca-
pable of executing every action required in that
procedure will be able to perform the measure-
ment.
Since not every process is a measurement, the
actions which constitute a measurement should
meet some restrictions. We have already men-
tioned that a measurement should be a process
that returns a quantity value, i.e. a number and
a reference, or even a formal entity (although
that would be outside the definition). Some au-
thors [17] have pointed out other basic charac-
teristics that a measurement should meet. For
instance, a measurement should be not an opin-
ion or guess, even if it is expressed by num-
bers. This condition can be directly translated
to the actions which constitutes the experiment
and the its structure: we cannot use opinion or
guess in the individual actions of the experi-
ment or in the flow of it.
An example of this situation is the instruc-
tion "write, in a one to then scale, the possi-
bilities of storm today". This cannot be used
as an instruction since uses the opinion of the
person who is performing the experiment. A
little change can turn this instruction in a valid
one, for example, "ask to a person to write, in
a one to ten scale, the possibilities of storm to-
day". Since the experimenter’s opinion is not
involved in the execution of the experiment this
is a valid instruction. We can also introduce
these opinions or random processes in the flow
of the process in a valid way, the instruction
"decide which blood group will be examined"
is not valid while "throw a dice to decide which
3blood group will be examined" is. This type
of instructions should be accepted as valid in-
structions, since they are present in the prac-
tice of the scientific community. One common
example are statistical proofs, where it is im-
portant to exclude the possibility of bias in an
experiment.
As, by construction, these processes are de-
fined by mechanical rules and actions, where
any decision must be mechanical, they share
this feature with algorithms.
There are other characteristics that link mea-
surement and algorithms. Algorithms are made
of processes that lack creativity. If there is a
measurement procedure of a well established
experiment, one that is already accepted by the
community, it is expected to have precise in-
structions that allows any person to perform it.
Instructions like "figure out a way to connect
this device with that one" cannot be part of
the measurement procedure, because they re-
quire creativity from the performer of the ex-
periment.
We have exhibited a parallelism between
measurements and algorithms: both return re-
sults, both have detailed descriptions, mea-
surements have measurement procedures, algo-
rithms have their code, or symbolic representa-
tion that describes them. There is, maybe one
difference between these concepts depending on
what we mean by algorithm. An algorithm nor-
mally has only one result, the correct result.
Depending on the repeatability of the experi-
ment, measurements can have different results
no matter how well specified are the conditions
in the measurement procedure. We will return
to this difference later.
EFFECTIVITY IN MEASUREMENTS
In the previous section we have described
the parallelism between measurements and al-
gorithms without specifying what we mean by
an algorithm. In this section this relation is an-
alyzed using a formal definition of algorithm.
Algorithms, in the modern view, are consid-
ered effective procedures [1]. Effective proce-
dures are those whose process can be executed
immediately, at will, without obstacles and will
always have a result. Write "hello" in a piece
of paper is a widely accepted effective proce-
dure, given that you have something to write
and something to write on. Other example can
be the measurement of the length of a table as
we discussed earlier. Both examples can be ex-
ecuted at will, in any time, assuming that all
the necessary resources are available.
On the other side we have examples of pro-
cesses that are not effective: "wait until your
aunt comes and say hi to her" is not effective.
While we can start it at will, i.e. start to wait,
we have no certainty if the second action can be
executed. Maybe our aunt will never appear or
maybe we do not have an aunt. Other exam-
ple is "divide 1 over 9 in the decimal system".
Such division has an infinite decimal expansion
so we can start to divide but we know for sure
we will never end.
We have mentioned above the lack of creativ-
ity as a feature of processes in the last section,
since a creative processes may or may not have
a result. It can be analyzed also as a require-
ment for effectivity. For instance, in the previ-
ously mentioned procedure "figure out a way to
connect this device with that one" is not an ef-
fective procedure, because a person could start
to think how to achieve such task but there is
no certainty of its success.
As measurements are expected to always pro-
duce results, when properly performed, in the
present context we assume that all measure-
ment procedures are effective, i.e. that every
measurement procedure will end with certainty
with a result.
The hypothesis of effectivity in measurement
procedures is not explicit in the definition of the
International Vocabulary of Metrology, but it is
implicitly assumed by experimentalists around
the globe. While it may be obvious in some
communities, in the following formal analysis
is important to state it explicitly.
FORMALIZATION OF EFFECTIVITY
AND MEASUREMENTS
Algorithms
Algorithms have a formal representation in
modern math. As a consequence of the im-
portance that algorithms had for mathemati-
cians in the beginnings of the past century, they
created a formal framework to describe them.
Though not the first one, the approach used by
Alan Turing is conceptually simple and nowa-
days very popular. The formal objects he cre-
ated are called Turing Machines.
A Turing machine is composed of basic in-
structions, similar to the series of actions de-
scribed above. That is, Turing machines
are descriptions of procedures or procedures
schemas [1, 2], in the same manner that mea-
surement procedures are descriptions of mea-
surements. This instructions are designed to
be performed by a very specific machine, a kind
4of printer, that consist in a mechanism and a
paper tape made of squares, each of which can
only contain one symbol at a time. On this tape
the machine can perform only three operations:
read a symbol from a specified set, called the
alphabet of that machine, print a symbol from
the alphabet and move to the adjacent squares.
The formal representation of an instruction
consists of four symbols. For instance, the
printing instruction is formally represented by:
qiSjSlqm, (1)
meaning that when the machine is in the state
qi (loosely speaking, the state is the list of sym-
bols which describes the actions the machine
can execute after reading a symbol from the
tape.) and reads the symbol Sj , it will print
the symbol Sl and change its state to qm.
The moving operations are represented by:
qiSjRqm (2)
qiSjLqm (3)
In this case the interpretation is: if the state
of the machine is qi and it reads the symbol Sj
then it will move to the right(left) and pass to
the state qm.
There are other basic considerations needed
in order to understand how this instructions are
executed by the machine. The idea is that the
machine has its whole set of instructions "in-
side". It starts by convention in the state q0.
It reads the first symbol, then applies the in-
struction that matches that state and symbol,
if doesn’t have any, it halts, meaning that the
calculation has ended. Since a Turing machine
is just a set of these instructions and the two
first symbols decide which instruction is used in
given situation, in a given machine there can-
not be two different instructions whose first two
symbols are the same.
Please note that, contrary to the terminol-
ogy, Turing machines are not machines or its
composition, they describe the process that a
machine will execute. Turing machines are sets
of instructions that represent processes. Again
we like to stress the analogy between these ma-
chines and measurement procedures. While
Turing machines describe algorithms, measure-
ment procedures describe measurements.
In the big picture, the way used to formalize
effective processes consists in selecting a small
set of very simple processes which are consid-
ered effective and well defined. They should be
so simple it is impossible to deny this two prop-
erties. With them it is possible to generate a
greater set of processes that consists in combi-
nations of the basic ones and the way they are
combined is such that the property of effectiv-
ity is conserved. As a consequence the basic
procedures have a central role in the argument.
Turing machines, with this restrictive set of in-
structions and rules, describe very well calcu-
lation procedures performed by humans. How-
ever, as Cleland has pointed out [2], the actions
corresponding to this basic instructions (read,
write and move), have no special place or prop-
erties. They are no different than the instruc-
tions found in a cooking recipe. These actions
are different from others because the interested
community accept them as well-defined and ef-
fective. The reason could be that they are fa-
miliar to all members of the community, or be-
cause, as Cleland said, it is easy in such com-
munity to train a person to do such actions in
an unequivocal manner. Once the community
accept them as basic effective procedures, their
combinations will result in more effective pro-
cedures.
Experimental processes
Having clarified this point, we consider a
wider set of actions, powerful enough to repre-
sent other processes. They involve more com-
plex actions than writing, reading and moving
on a tape. Of course, as we have discussed ear-
lier, these set of actions have to be considered
by the community of that field as effective and
well-defined in the context their discipline. We
call such set of actions the experimental possi-
bilities and are analogous to the printing, read-
ing and moving of a Turing machine.
For instance, to impose a voltage between
two cables can be see as a trivial task in the
state of art of modern labs, and therefore can
be considered as an action part of our experi-
mental possibilities. However, we need to have
in mind the huge number of hypothesis behind
this statement: the cables are made of metal,
are isolated, they are of reasonable size, the
voltage will be on average the given value but
will be some noise, etcetera. Such action may
be considered trivial in the electronics commu-
nity, where they are part of their every day
practice, but not necessarily in the medicine
community, or even the transmission lines com-
munity.
It is also true that sometimes, in given a com-
munity, it is possible to reduce an action to
simpler ones, explaining the action or using an
apparatus that simplifies the action. From the
point of view of scientists in the 19th century, to
impose a voltage of 10 volts in a pair of cables
was not a trivial task at all, even with all the
5previous mentioned hypothesis. To impose a
voltage is a trivial task for modern laboratories
because they have voltage supplies with which
it is possible to translate such action into sim-
pler ones, like pressing buttons and connecting
wires. Removing such supplies can transform
an effective procedure into a non-effective one,
if there is no other way to impose such voltage
with the other equipment in the lab or there is
no knowledge of how to do it since, as we’ve
mentioned above, creative processes are ruled
out. Cleland has also discussed this issue [2]:
The success of human beings in
following imprecisely described in-
structions is a product of training
coupled with a shared repertoire of
basic bodily actions such as moving
a finger or rotating a wrist.
i.e. all actions can be reduced to some set of
actions she called "bodily actions". For our
present purposes it is enough to consider the
set of basic experimental possibilities, those ac-
cepted by the community in which the proce-
dures are executed.
Experimental procedures
With this considerations in mind, and spe-
cially due to the nature of Turing machines as
"procedure schemas", as Cleland puts it, but
using a more complex set of basic actions, it is
possible to use such machines in order to rep-
resent measurement procedures. We will for-
mally represent a measurement procedure as a
set of instructions, just like a Turing machine.
This instructions, however will use a wider set
of actions. For instance, an instruction can be
represented in the following way:
qiSjIkqlqm (4)
meaning that: "if you are in the state qi and
you read a symbol Sj then perform the action
Ik and pass to the state ql. In case the ac-
tion Ik cannot be performed, move to the state
qm". This description only leaves the actions Ik
as abstract actions that should fulfill the con-
ditions discussed above.
Many actions need to receive information, to
"see" something other than the tape. We call
them reading actions Vk, they are actions that
verify some binary statement. For instance,
"the second digit is seven". Depending if this
statement is true or not it is possible to make
decisions. They are represented in this type of
instruction:
qiSjVkqlqmqp, (5)
whose meaning is: "if you are in the state qi
and you read a symbol Sj , then perform the
reading action Vk and pass to the state ql, if
the statement is true, and qm if the statement
is untrue. In case the action Vk cannot be per-
formed, move to the state qp".
Here we have kept the tape of the Turing ma-
chines, as a representation of a "piece of paper"
that will allow to write results. They can be
used in later steps to perform calculations, since
the mere definition of measurement procedure
requires such. Therefore these machines can
perform actions in order to execute the mea-
surement, but restrict themselves to write, read
and move when only formal calculation are re-
quired. 1
The presence of the tape allows a formal def-
inition the measurement result, as the string of
characters leaved in the tape once the machine
stopped. Note that the measurement result is
by definition a quantity value that is composed,
again by definition in the vocabulary, by a num-
ber and a reference, e.g. 10km. In the present
context it is a mere sequence of symbols, i.e.
"10km", without the meaning of number or ref-
erence. In this way the algorithmic descrip-
tion includes generalized measurement process,
where the result can be a nominal (qualitative)
quantity value [9], like the sex of an animal
or the colour of a spot test in chemistry. It is
important to stress that this description only
applies to the measurement procedure. The as-
sociation between quantity and quantity value
is outside its scope.
Having specified the result of a measurement,
we can discuss its repeatability. A machine is
repeatable if every time the procedure is exe-
cuted it gives the same result, the same string
of symbols. In those cases in which the result
is a number and a reference, uncertainties and
noise must be considered. Adding to the in-
structions in the procedure to only report a def-
inite number of significant figures, a reasonable
set of repeatable measurement procedures can
be obtained. This is a very narrow, algorithmic
definition of repeatablility,
We end this section with a summary of the
formal concepts we have introduced. To rep-
resent measurement procedures, we use formal
objects called Turing machines. These objects
have a set of symbols and a endless tape. Using
them they can perform operations: write, read
1 This calculations, by the way, can be performed with-
out any knowledge of the math beneath them since
can be always reduced to the mechanical operations
of the machine.
6and move in the tape. In order extend their
possibilities we add basic processes called ac-
tions, that extend the possible instructions for
the machine.
While a regular Turing machine consists of
three types of instructions 2:
qiSjSkql, (6)
qiSjRql, (7)
qiSjLql, (8)
the proposed formal model has two more, that
is five possibilities:
qiSjSkql, (9)
qiSjRql, (10)
qiSjLql, (11)
qiSjqlqm, (12)
qiSjIkqlqm, (13)
qiSjVkqlqmqn, (14)
where Ik represents the k−th possible action of
the machine, and Vk reading actions. These are
well-defined and effective actions accepted by
the community in which these procedures are
designed and executed. The set of all actions
performed by a machine {Ik, Vj} are called its
experimental possibilities. Finally, if the result
of executing a machine M with an input e, is
the same every time, the machine is called re-
peatable and the result is denoted M(e).
The association of modern computers with
Turing machines allows for a generalization of
their actions, to include the manipulation of
punched cards, magnetic tapes, electronic de-
vices, etc. They are referred as the hardware,
whose detailed description is not required if it
is guaranteed that they can realize the required
actions. In a measurement procedure, the sym-
bols describe the manipulation of a variety of
systems whose properties are measured, and of
the devices employed in the procedure, whose
outputs are read. The automatization of many
measurements helps to visualize these actions
as simple extensions of Turing machines.
CONSEQUENCES OF ALGORITHMIC
FORMULATION OF PROCEDURES.
Up to here we have discussed the relation be-
tween measurement procedures and algorithms,
describing the later as Turing machines. Em-
ploying them we formally defined the result of
2 We can add the oracle as a fourth instruction [4].
a measurement and its repeatability. Now we
are interested in the formal properties that can
be proved using such definition.
The most famous and important result in re-
lation with Turing machines is the halting prob-
lem. It consists in determining if a machine
with a given input will ever halt. This is im-
portant to our discussion since halting implies
having a result and we have stated that a mea-
surement must be effective, i.e. must end with
certainty with a result.
We pose the question: Is it possible to de-
termine whether a given procedure corresponds
to a valid measurement process, i.e. it always
has a result? This effective criteria, if it ex-
ists, should be another process whose input is
a procedure, and the output is yes, it is a mea-
surement process, or no, it is not. We show here
that it is not possible to have such criteria.
The Halting Problem
This is a brief and informal description of the
Halting Problem [4, 11].
1. We start assuming that there is a decisive
process that allows to decide if a given
procedure halts, i.e. gives a result. Such
process takes a procedure, i.e. a formal
description of the instructions, as its in-
put, applies some actions and returns ’H’
if the procedure has a result (halts) and
’N’ in the other case.
2. A second process is built employing the
first. It works in this way:
• It has both the target procedure and
the decisive algorithm as its inputs.
• It reads the output of the decisive
algorithm applied to the procedure.
• If the output is ’N’ it gives a result,
which can be any, and halts.
• If the output is ’H’ it never gives a
result, continues to perform actions
idly.
As a result, this second, combined process
halts if and only if its target procedure
doesn’t.
3. Since the combined process has a pro-
cedure, i.e. a description, just like any
other, it can be employed as the target
procedure. In this case "The combined
process halts if and only if the combined
process doesn’t". This is a clear logical
contradiction.
7The hypothesis that lead to the contradiction
was that there is a process that can always de-
cide if a given procedure halts. It follows that
such process cannot exist. No process can al-
ways decide if a given procedure halts.
Valid measurements
In this section, we extend the above result to
prove that it is not possible to determine if a
given procedure measures a given quantity. To
simplify the discussion, let’s assume that there
is a tentative procedure to measure tempera-
ture and want to determine if it is a valid mea-
surement procedure. The condition is that it
must be effective, give a result in each occasion
it is employed and coincide with the reference
measurement procedure [9]. The demonstra-
tion follows the same steps as above. The whole
process if represented in Fig. 1.
1. We start assuming that there is a veri-
fication process that allows to decide if
the tentative procedure measures temper-
ature. It takes the tentative procedure as
its input and returns ’Yes’ if the proce-
dure measures temperature and ’No’ in
the other case. It is represented as the
blue process in Fig. 1.
2. A second, green process is built employing
the first. It works in this way:
• It has the tentative procedure as in-
put and uses the verification process.
• It reads the output of the verification
process applied to the procedure.
• If the output is ’No’ it measures
the temperature employing the ref-
erence procedure, prints the result
and halts.
• If the output is ’Yes’ it turns off
the tentative procedure, prints ’no
temperature has been measured’ and
halts.
The last two steps are represented as the
red process in Fig. 1. As a result, this
green process measures the temperature
if and only if its target procedure doesn’t.
3. The green procedure is fed with its own
procedure as input. Then, "The green
process measures the temperature if and
only if the green process doesn’t". Again
we arrive to a logical contradiction.
Does the input 
measures temperature?
NoYes
Input 
Procedure
Output value
Figure 1. The assumption of the existence of the
blue experimental procedure leads to a contradic-
tion.
The contradiction proves that the first hy-
pothesis was false: there cannot exist a veri-
fication process that allows to always decide if
the tentative procedure measures temperature.
In general, it is not possible to determine if
a given procedure corresponds to a valid mea-
surement process, i.e. it always has a result.
Formal demonstration
The argument we have just draw is a direct
application of the diagonal method. In a way, is
a carbon copy of Turing’s halting problem, Rice
theorem or other related results [4, 11].
Lets define the set of process Ω as all the ef-
fective processes we’ve discussed earlier. Math-
ematically it is the set of machines that halt, so
they have a result with certainty, though such
result does not have to be repeatable. In other
words, a process M ∈ Ω will halt in every exe-
cution, but not necessarily return the same re-
sult.
Above we insisted in the relation between a
process and its procedure, formally a process
M has a description or procedure that we will
denote as pMq. Please note that pMq is just a
string of symbols that allows any trained person
(or a computer with an appropriate code) to
execute the process M .
Suppose that there is a repeatable process
blue ∈ Ω capable to decide if another proce-
dure measures temperature when fed with an
input e. That is blue(pMq, e) returns ’1’ if
M(e) always measures temperature and ’0’ in
the other case. blue should be a repeatable 3
3 This is necessary because there are non-repeatable
procedures that sometimes measure temperature and
sometimes other property but the election is done in
a random fashion.
8process if we want the right answer with cer-
tainty. M(e), though not necessarily repeat-
able, should measure temperature always in or-
der to satisfy blue. Finally, we use T (M(e)) to
denote that M(e) measures temperature, i.e.
T (M(e)) is either true or false.
Using the above elements, we can write the
property of the blue process as:
ifM ∈ Ω =⇒
blue(pMq, e) =′ 1′ ⇐⇒ T (M(e)).
For the next step in our argument we need
a green process with the particular property
"measures temperature only when its input
doesn’t". We accomplish this using the pro-
cedures blue and red. This can be represented
by:
ifM ∈ Ω =⇒
T (green(pMq, e)) ⇐⇒ ¬T (M(e)).
Next, we feed the process with its own pro-
cedure by defining the process G(pMq) =
green(pMq, pMq). Therefore the last formal
statement can be rewritten as:
ifM ∈ Ω =⇒
T (G(pMq)) ⇐⇒ ¬T (M(pMq)).
The last step in order to get the desired con-
tradiction is to take the special case M = G:
ifG ∈ Ω =⇒
T (G(pGq)) ⇐⇒ ¬T (G(pGq)).
The conclusion is that the procedure G can-
not exist or it cannot be in Ω.
The hypothesis involved
We have assumed the existence of the pro-
cesses blue and red. But only one of these ma-
chines can exist, the existence of both lead us
to a contradiction. For the red procedure to
exist, there must be an alternative procedure
available to be employed when the output of
blue is ’1’. For this reason, this demonstration
is valid when a standard procedure has already
been accepted by a community to measure a
given quantity. It does not apply when new
quantities are introduced. It must also be pos-
sible to ’turn off’ the input procedure. This is
very simple, just to instruct red to do not use it
in this case is enough. It is the blue procedure
the one which cannot exist.
There is another important aspect of the
proof that may awake some objections, we have
only considered procedures that have an argu-
ment. There are lots of procedures that have
an argument, using it they decide which actions
should be performed. But, there are numerous
measurement procedures that does not need an
argument in order to perform its task. Are our
conclusions valid for these procedures? Con-
sider a process M with a particular input e.
It is always possible to design another process
that doesn’t take any arguments. It first prints
the particular input e and then, immediately,
performs all the actions M would perform nor-
mally. Therefore, for every process with a par-
ticular input, there is another process without
input that reproduces exactly the process fol-
lowed by M with input e. If we had a mea-
surement procedure capable of solving whether
or not a process without arguments measures
temperature, we will be capable of solving the
problem for all the processes with a particu-
lar input. Since we’ve already discarded that
option, the processes without arguments can-
not have a effective procedure to decide if them
measure temperature or not.
It is actually possible to extend this method,
the diagonal method, to other properties of in-
terest in the realm of measurement processes
and procedures. There may be other impor-
tant verification processes that also had some
limitations due to the nature of the property
they verify, in the same manner Rice theorem
applies for a big set of properties [10]. This will
be subject of other work.
CONCLUSIONS
Along this article, we have shown that mea-
surement procedures are processes, which can
be described as algorithms. As every measure-
ment is expected to produce a result, we con-
cluded that these processes must be effective. It
allowed us to describe measurement procedures
as generalized Turing machines. They have re-
sults, chains of symbols which are generalized
quantity values.
We introduced the experimental possibilities,
the set of actions considered by the community
of that field as effective and well-defined in the
context their discipline. They are analogous to
the printing, reading and moving of a Turing
machine. Following the same logical construc-
tion of the halting problem, we proved that it
cannot exist an effective algorithmic process to
determine if a tentative procedure describes a
valid measurement process. In general, this rel-
evant question must be agreed by the commu-
nity involved.
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